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Brazil's economy since the 1850s has been dominated by the production and
export of coffee. Production was popular before this time but by mid-century it had
exploded and continued to flourish into contemporary times. The role of the Brazilian
government has been both a hindrance and a source of assistance to the coffee producers
and refiners. Govemment policies in the 20th century have dictated many facets of coffee
production in Brazil. Many different government bureaucracies have been established
throughout this past century such as the National Coffee Department and the National
Coffee Council. Brazilhas belonged to a number of international agencies and
agreements that have also guided policies. This paper will attempt to examine coffee and
its role on Brazilian and intemational politics from the turn of the century into the 1970s.
How much of Brazil's coffee industry is controlled by non-Bruzilian interests? Has the
precedence that coffee growing had over subsistence agriculture had an effect on politics?
An attempt to answer these and other related questions will be contained within this
paper.
Politics and the production of coffee go back as far as the early lgth century.
Stability of the political atmosphere often rested on the coffee-growing zones of Sao
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais.l The slavery issue was highly centered around
the coffee industry because of its use of slave labor but by 1888 slavery in Brazil comes
to an end. The end of forced labor signaled a new demand for labor in the newly
emerging wage labor system. Immigration would be the only viable option to gain the
workers needed in the agricultural production of coffee. In 1885 there were only a total
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of 6,600 new immigrants in Brazil. By 1887 this number had increased to 32,000 and in
1888 over 90,000 immigrants arrived in Brazil thatyeat.2
Evidence from the early 20th century shows thatBrazilhad control of over three-
fourths of the world's commercial coffee production. Central America contributed only
one-eighth of the total production and the East Indies only a handful of bags.3 Brazil's
domination of the market at this time and throughout its reign can be attributed to its
climate and geography. The coffee lands reside in a very favorable position of the
Brazilian highlands that is very well watered and close to the ocean. These highlands are
on the windward, southeastem slopes which receive ample rainfall through the trade
winds. The soil is composed of lots of decayed plant material that makes for very fertile
ground. The soil is also very humid and can withstand continued production. Because of
the close proximity to the ocean, these coffee growing lands make transportation much
easier and accessible than in other regions of the world.a
Throughout the 20th century, what would become known as coffee oligarchies
which were the rich and elite of society would come to dominate politics in Brazil.
Because the states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais were the most coffee rich, they too
controlled the policies and politics of most of the nation. The five presidents from 1894
to 1910 were all elected from one of these states.s It is worth taking note that describing
these presidents as elected officials may be somewhat misleading considering only 2
percent of the nation's people were eligible to vote. The coffee policies at the beginning
of the 20th century would become the guidelines for the basic strategy of the government
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for the next fifty. The first part of the scheme was to calculate what the average
consumption was globally and then make sure production mirrored this estimate. By
doing so prices would remain stable and a surplus of coffee would be avoided. In the
years of natural overproduction the surplus would be stored and sold later during times of
natural shortage.6 Because of the enduring quality of the coffee berry this strategy
worked well and maintained a stable price for a number of years. Another part of the
plan was a govenrment ban on all new coffee planting in1902 which was to last for five
years.' The plan was so efficient that the market was almost guaranteed a stable price
sponsored in part by the government that enacted legislation that prohibited the extension
of coffee lands. Agreements between states such as Rio and Bahia would help finance
the warehousing of yearly surpluses in order to maintain a decent price for coffee. This
was coupled with a vigorous propaganda campaign to increase consumption of coffee at
home and abroad and the result was outstanding success with consumption increasing
worldwide. Early assessments of the valorization program would deem it already
obsolete but this policy would maintain stable coffee prices until World War I. However,
starting in 1907 this policy was already being circumvented because of the ever
increasing production levels of the old estate owners. What was happening was that even
though the govemment had outlawed new lands from coming under coffee cultivation the
old lands were increasing their production without increasing the area under
development. The result was that Brazilproduced 85 percent of the world's supply by
the end of 1907.8
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Increased loans from foreign debtors would be the only way out of the impending
economic disaster. The govemment of Sao Paulo organized a $75,000,000 loan on top of
pervious loans of $15,000,000 and $5,000,000 to help alleviate the situation. Two-thirds
of this loan would be provided by financiers from American, British, and German banks
with the French taking up the last one-third. ln exchange for this bailout the foreign
institutions called for the Brazilian govemment to stop manipulating the coffee market by
artificial means.' These same foreign investors would come to generate huge profits
from their intervention into the Brazilian coffee market.
There is some debate about the use of land and just what the effect of the policies
had during the 1920s. Dr. Maurico Font argues that immigration of Europeans and other
people from around the world would come to form a competing force that "traditional
planters" would come to loathe.lo These traditional planters would be represented by the
oligarchs mentioned above. They were commonly in possession of thousands of acres of
land with thousands of coffee trees. They were able to influence govemment to set
policies that were favorable to their business. The incoming immigrants were to become
known as colonos.ll These immigrants were tenant farmers that paid rent to their land
owning elites. The colono was allowed to use some of the land to plant subsistent cereals
such as beans and maize. Font argues that most often times these immigrants were able
to grow so much excess food that they could sell it on the open market and pull a steady
profit. He also argues that this began to form a mechanism that allowed for greater social
mobility in the lower classes and an increased social equality between the elite land
e taiazzz




owners and the peasant class. Later evidence would show that this claim may be
somewhat unjustifiable. Figures from 1927 show that of the coffee trees in Sao Paulo,
18.4 percent were grown on73.7 percent of all coffee farms that had less than twenty
thousand trees and in contrast 48.2 percent of the trees were cultivated on the 6.1 percent
of estates with more than one hundred thousand trees.l2 These figures would make it
clear that at least by 1927,the large estates were producing most of the coffee. And if the
large estates were the predominate producers than there certainly was no emerging
"middle class" in which an immigrant could come to Brazil and work hard on his
landlord's plantation until he had enough money to buy his own land. Font, the writer
that argues for the emergence of a middle class through this system cites information
provided by "official" sources that may have some inherent bias included within them.
Statistics like those from 1932 and 1934 data show 39 to 42 percent of the coffee trees in
Sao Paulo were owned by foreign born growers.13 The validity of this statement must be
questioned because of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
The Paulistan system as this relation would come to be known, was likened to that
of feudal Europe where the lords would reside over a population of peasants in exchange
for rents in the form of harvested crops. The system worked well because it allowed the
worker to work for a wage while he also worked his own small piece of land that
provided food for his family.la This system was dependant upon a continuous flow of
immigrants and this process was subsidizedby govemment legislation that allowed for
hundreds of thousands of foreigners to enter the country.
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Returning now to the valorization program that was started around 1907, the
1920s would be a time of increased coffee production. The Coffee Institute was
established in Sao Paulo which would attempt to regulate the market more efficiently in
order to avoid another need for foreign investment. This plan again rested on the premise
of storing coffee and placing the surpluses in govemment warehouses that would later be
sold according to export needs.l5 This program would require financing of the producers
whose coffee was being placed in storage. This program appeared to be working since
prices remained stable until1929 when the govemment was forced to acquire more and
more foreign money to finance the domestic growers. By 1930 foreign loans accounted
for $1,181 million in which Brazilwas required to pay $200 million annually to service
the debt.16 This was nearly one-third of the nation's national budget and would become
an increased burden throughout the programs lifetime.
Increased trouble for Brazil came in lg22whenthe Brazilian Communist Party
denounced the coffee oligarchy that controlled and commanded coffee growing policies
in the country. This unrest was quickly quelled but not soon after another rebellion of a
much more dynamic scale occurred. IrrL1924 a group of officers from a garrison in
Copacabana would incite a revolt that would takes violent force from the government in
order to maintain stability. Some of the primary complaints of these insurgents were that
the government had forfeited the interests of the people and instead entertained the
interests of the coffee oligarchs. This was for the most part true since the current
President Pereira devoted increased funds to the valorization program and sought to
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repress public welfare programs instead opting for a privately funded social welfare
progfirm. t7
Once the Great Depression of the 1930s hit the price of coffee fell dramatically.
Prices fell from 22.5 cents per pound to just eight cents per pound. With the price of
coffee low govemment warehouses began to fill up with even more excess coffee. The
valorization program was becoming too much for the Brazilian govemment and could no
longer acquire foreign loans because of the drastic shortage of capital that was
characteristic of a Depression era economy.18 The extreme conditions brought on by the
Depression would split the dominant coffee producing states of Sao Paulo and Minas
Gerais and spell the end to the "Old republic" that had been on control of politics for so
very long. Getuilio Vargras would win the 1930 election running on the Liberal Alliance
party ticket and would signal to some the end of politics dominated by the elite and show
the breaking in of politics by the bourgeois.
Starting in the 1930s, Braziliancoffee officials in conjunction with technicians
from the American company Nestle began using a method previously used to make
powdered milk on stockpiles of coffee. This method would transform the coffee into
instant coffee that was slowly becoming more popular around the world. For example,
the U.S. began deploying all of their troops with rations of instant coffee and this would
later create a large demand as a convenient consumer product since millions of young
men were exposed to the product.le By 1960, consumption of instant coffee would
constitute 20 to 25 percent of all coffee consumption in the United States. Because
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Brazil's prior solution to the excess amounts of coffee was to bum the crop, tuming it
into instant coffee with some value added was a very attractive altemative. For instance
in 1961, Brazilburned 7 million of the 43 million bags of coffee it had in storage.2o It
was costing the government $12.6 million ayeff to maintain these stockpiles. Another
alternative was for the eradication of the trees themselves. Getting rid of the surplus
amounts of coffee was just one of the benefits that would be attained through the shift to
instant coffee with another coming with some industrialization through the construction
of domestic factories producing instant coffee.2l kL 1964 Nestle built a factory in Brazil
that would produce for local and foreign markets. Because instant coffee was far enough
along in its product life cycle there was little need for further research and development
of the product or the technologies to produce it.22 Brazilwould take the lead in the
production of instant coffee in Latin America with Colombia and Ecuador following
close behind. Even though Brazilwas the second largest consumer of coffee in the
world, they never caught on to the consumption of instant coffee the way the coffee
consuming nations like the U.S. had. But with increased production of coffee resulting in
an annual surplus, the Brazilian coffee agency (Instituto Brasileiro de Caf6) announced a
series of initiatives to encourage the construction of instant coffee factories.23 The
Brazilian manufacturers Dominium and Cacique would begin building factories in 1965
and would open even more factories throughout the decade until by 1969 they would take
control of 14 percent of the U.S. market. "BrazilPowder" would be the label for most
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instant coffees leaving Brazil and was more than able to compete with other
manufactures of the commodity. It was able to do so because quality of the coffee was
better than most American firms that used a more robust form of coffee in their product.
Also, since the Brazilian manufacturers did not have to pay export prices for the coffee
they used they were able to produce the instant coffee at nearly 50 cents cheaper than
their American counterpart.2a This was a substantial amount since the price in most
American outlets was around $2.50 a pound. Soon the U.S. govemment would enact
legislation that put the two nations on a more equal basis in terms of price of product and
with the passing of Article 44 andthe lnternational Coffee Agreement Brazil would have
no advantage left at all.2s In a l97l agreement Brazil agreed to sell 560,000 bags of
coffee beans per year to U.S. instant-coffee manufactures that would be exempt from
export taxes. However this agreement would not be renewed the next time it came up in
1972. Soon Brazilian production of instant coffee would outstrip demand and another
economic crisis would take place with more funds needed from outsido sources.
Throughout my research I began to realize a trend that occurred within Brazilian
coffee production. This trend is obvious throughout this paper and that was a mutually
beneficial relationship that those in power shared with foreign banks and debtors. Why
were the government officials so willing to take on an increased debt load even through
the early part of the century instead of a widespread agrarian reform that would distribute
the land to landless peasants? This tendency is common throughout Central and South
America and it can only be assumed that power will comrpt most leaders and that the
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